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Division of Medicaid - Mississippi Law

Pursuant to Mississippi law, the Division of Medicaid has “subrogation rights” (not a lien) in the proceeds of a tort judgment or settlement “to the extent of the Division of Medicaid’s interest on behalf of the recipient.”  Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-125(1).  This subrogation interest is limited to payments made by the Division of Medicaid “as a result of injuries, disease or sickness caused under circumstances creating a cause of action in favor of the [Medicaid] recipient against a third party.”  Id.

Division of Medicaid - Federal Law

Under federal law, the Division of Medicaid may not recover “any portion of a Medicaid beneficiary’s tort judgment or settlement not ‘designated as payments for medical care.’”  Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 2013 WL 1131709 at *1 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006)).  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(25)(B) provides that the Division of Medicaid may, in cases where “legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance has been provided” to an individual, “seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal liability.”

Division of Medicaid’s subrogation

“The purposes of subrogation are to prevent the insured from recovering twice for the same loss and to reimburse the insurer when a third party should be required to pay for the loss.”  Armstrong v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 66 So.3d 188, 191 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

Division of Medicaid’s burden of proving reasonableness

Under the statute creating the Division of Medicaid’s subrogation interest, Medicaid bears the burden of proving “the amount and correctness of its claim relating to the injury, disease or sickness” that was at issue in the underlying tort action.  Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-125(3).

Division of Medicaid - Court's Reductions

Once Medicaid has borne its burden of proving which of its subrogation claims are “a result of” or “related to” the fault or alleged fault of the third party, this Court is to deduct “[t]he reasonable costs of collection, including attorney’s fees, as approved and allowed by the court”.  Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-125(2).  The Court may also account for other factors in setting the amount of Medicaid’s recovery, including a “pro rata” share and the other interests traditionally committed to the Chancery Court in handling minor’s business.  Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-125(2)(b).

Medicaid's Subrogation limited to Cost of Medical care

The Court must deny Medicaid’s subrogation interest entirely if no portion of the settlement at issue is a recovery of costs of medical care.  Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 2013 WL 1131709 at *1 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006)).

Manual for Complex Litigation “MCL” – Federal Practice Guide https://public.resource.org/scribd/8763868.pdf

3M Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2885 – Master Docket No. 3:19md2885

http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/mdl2885

Young v. BL Development Corp. D/B/A Harrah’s Casino Tunica and Veranda Hotel, Civil Action No. 3:19cv034-NBB-RP, :

It is well-settled that federal courts refer to state law for tolling rules just as they do for statutes of limitation. Wallace v. Keto, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). The broad language of the tolling provision cited by the plaintiff, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-57, undoubtedly applies under the circumstances of this case. It cannot be legitimately disputed that the automatic stay and injunction order at issue here prohibited and enjoined the plaintiff from commencing her action against the defendant. Though, as the defendant argues, the plaintiff could have petitioned the bankruptcy court for relief from the stay or order, the applicable tolling provision requires no such action. See Trustmark Nat’l Bank v. Pike County Nat’l Bank, 716 So. 2d 618 (Miss. 1998).

The court finds that the Mississippi tolling provision is applicable under the facts of this case. The result is that the limitations period was tolled during both the automatic stay and the period covered by the injunction order. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss is not well taken and shall be denied.

Remand from Federal Court back to State Court

“In removal practice, when a complaint does not allege a specific amount of damages, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “[B]are allegations of jurisdictional facts have been held insufficient to invest a federal court with jurisdiction.” Id. (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The notice of removal instead contends that the plaintiff’s request for unspecified punitive damages is sufficient to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. In recent years, however, at least three Judges in this District have “look[ed] more rigorously at the complaint’s factual allegations to determine whether the combination of compensatory and [unspecified] punitive damages could truly support a recovery above $75,000.” Evans v. Red Shield Admin., Inc. , No. 3:18-CV-464-CWR-FKB, 2018 WL 4288724, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 17, 2018) (collecting cases). Based on those decisions, the better-reasoned conclusion is that “an unspecified punitive damages demand is itself insufficient to meet the amount in controversy requirement.” Id. at *2.

Mississippi GAP ACT requirement compliant forms for Chancery Court

Madison County Chancery Court updated guardianships and conservatorships forms. (January 1, 2020  Update).  Forms are GAP ACT compliant and avaialble for download in WordPerfect and PDF format.  (Click Here)

Judge Robert G. Clark, III – Judge

Chancery Court Judge
Sub District One
Office: (662) 834-1285
 

Judge Cynthia Brewer – Senior Judge

Chancery Court Judge
Sub District Two
Office: (601) 855-5512
 

James C. Walker – Judge

Chancery Court Judge
Sub District Three
Office: 601-855-5707

11th Chancery Court District Main Office
146 West Center Street
P.O. Box 404
Canton, MS 39046
Office: (601) 859-1177
Fax: (601) 859-0795

OPEN & OBVIOUS DEFENSE

First, conditions are not either open and obvious or not open and obvious. Common sense and experience negates an either/or categorization of such conditions. Just how open and obvious a condition may have been is a question for the jury in all except the clearest cases.

More fundamentally, the rule for which the City argues would exonerate it no matter how negligent the City may have been and no matter how “active” that negligence may have been at the time. We might as well exonerate as a matter of law a defendant who leaves his car parked in the middle of the street on grounds that the car was open and obvious.

In prior cases involving hazards that were extremely “open and obvious”, this Court has not barred injured parties from recovery, but rather has left the issue to the jury properly instructed regarding comparative negligence. Where a defendant negligently creates an unreasonably unsafe condition in an area where the plaintiff has every right to be, that defendant may not escape liability by arguing that the condition was open and obvious.

Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So. 2d 657, 664 (Miss. 1985)